Is this the Extremist Profile of a Suicide Terrorist?

Doctorate Research series paper by Robert J. Fraser, M.A. (Count.Terr.Studies)

“The suicide terrorist is the ultimate ‘smart bomb’ – a human missile

relentlessly homing in on its target but with flexibility in timing and access”

Hoffman (2006, p. 132)

This paper will look at the issue of radicalization and suicide terrorists; firstly looking at the definition and secondly looking at the indicators of radicalization taken from current research.

According to Leiken and Brooke (2006, pp. 507-510) the ‘threat of Western Militant Jihadism is not limited to one country or region, with trends suggesting an exceptionally wide and expanding geographic area of participation’ (see also comments from Egerton and Wilner, 2009, pp. 2-5).

One particular area that will greatly facilitate this trend is that of radicalization.  Radicalisation is a term that is frequently used within the counter-terrorism networks however it’s real meaning is more complex than most understand.

We will look at the term ‘radicalisation’ and some of the meanings of the word that are used by academics and practitioners alike.  We will also go beyond ‘the definition’ to look at the ‘meaning’ or ‘essence’ of the word which is much more complex.

We will also cover the issue of radicalization in regards to terrorism activity and non-activity, those who have been radicalised but have no interest in committing terrorist related offences.

In researching the term ‘radicalisation’ and what its general meaning is understood to be, there is a noticeable difference between western understandings and those of more ideological beliefs.  Perhaps that is an obvious observation however it is more than that – radicalization appears to be a complex process that has varying interpretations to various people.  

Radicalisation cannot be simply defined in a single word but rather a series of processes. Having reached the final or last stage of these processes, a person (male or female, young or old, individuals or groups) may be deemed to have been ’radicalised’ according to Western understandings and standards.

Looking first at the definition of radicalization, a fairly simple view was given by Wilner and Dubouloz (2009) who stated that radicalization is “a process by which an individual or group comes to adopt increasingly extreme political, social or religious ideals and aspirations that reject or undermine the status quo”.

While it is reducing radicalization to very simple terms, Wilner and Dubouloz have captured the essence of the definition but in this simple description they fail to capture the true ‘meaning’ of what radicalization is and the extended process that is involved.

There are also many other, rather short descriptors of radicalization.   For example, Precht (2007, p. 16) in his analysis titled ‘An assessment of the factors influencing violent Islamist extremism and suggestions for counter radicalisation measures’ for the Danish Security Service describes radicalization as “a process of adopting an extremist belief system and the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence and fear, as a method of effecting changes in society. Radicalisation can take place within any extremist group (from left/right wing groups to environmentalist, separatist and terrorist groups). It is important to note that radicalisation, as such, does not necessarily have to result in terrorism and the use of violence”.

Although lengthy it is nevertheless important to include the full definition according to Precht. When describing radicalization, a common theme among the many authors is that radicalization does not necessarily mean a conversation to violence or to the extreme use of terrorist related activities.

Based upon the four identified stages that have been identified, there is a general consensus amongst many theorists that one can enter the first, second and third levels of radicalization without causing terrorism.  This position is supported by Precht (2007, p. 16), Silber & Bhatt (2007, 

Interestingly Precht (2007), like Silber & Bhatt (2007) and also Buruma (2007), has identified four phases strikingly similar to the others.  He describes these as being “Pre-Radicalisation, Conversion, Conviction and lastly Violent Action’.

In all cases the use of further descriptors for the term ‘radicalisation’ seems necessary as it (radicalization) is a series of defined interventions by the terrorist theology upon the individual (or group in some cases).

However Silber and Bhatt (2007, pp. 6-7) went further in their definition.  In a similar fashion to Buruma (2007, pp.187-213) they included the processes involved and identified four main steps to radicalization.  These were, in order of process, ”pre-radicalisation, self identification, indoctrination and finally jihadisation”.

This report was prepared as an intelligence analysis by two senior analysts (Silber and Bhatt) to ‘assist policy makers and law enforcement officials on how best to counter the emerging threat by better understanding what constitutes the radicalization process’. (Silber & Bhatt, 2007, p. 2).

According to their definition and understanding through their research, Silber & Bhatt define each stage: Pre-radicalisation is “an individuals life prior to radicalization, Self-Identification is where the individual comes to identify with radical movements, Indoctrination is where the individual focuses on their beliefs and they intensify their understandings and finally Radicalisation where the individual now starts to act based upon their new beliefs”.

While their work goes further than a ‘definition’ for Radicalisation, it is perhaps the best, most description analysis of radicalization as it encompasses not only the words, but also the ‘meaning and essence’ of radicalization.

Their work and research was very well done and is used extensively in law enforcement areas within the United States. 

We cannot however look at any definition of radicalization without looking at the definition and essence of the term from the eyes of radicals themselves.

Buruma (2007, pp. 187-213) takes the case of Mohammed Bouyeri who was tried for a jihadist murder.  According to Buruma, Bouyeri was converted to Jihadism in under a year having gone through the four stages described by Buruma as “rejecting western values, rejecting the democratic state and its legal institutions, calling for a global jihad against democracy and finally advocating violence against individuals who had insulted Islam of the Prophet”.

It is interesting in this example that the method of radicalization has been described by one who was subjected to this, albeit voluntarily.  The four stages of the process vary slightly from other definitions and examples (which we have discussed with the definitions by Silber & Bhatt).

Overall however perhaps the best description of the real ‘essence’ of radicalization is that offered by Silber & Bhatt (2007).  Their ‘definition’, coupled with the research and identification of the salient issues of radicalization, makes this the most easily understood definition of what radicalization really is and more importantly how the ‘essence’ of the radicalization process works.

This segment of the paper will now look at the causes of terrorism through radicalization and how individuals or groups can change so dramatically from non-violence to extremely violent terrorist acts.

We will discuss the ‘steps’ of radicalization and look into how they work and importantly whom they work on.  We will look at the vulnerabilities in individuals and groups, which may make them more susceptible to radicalization techniques.

We will also discuss and review case studies of radicalization successes and equally important the failures.  We will review the work of prominent researchers and intelligence analysts into radicalization and the varying stages that the radicalisation process takes.

We will also look at the various communication platforms that radicalization processes use in their process including published writings, the rise in radicalisation within prison environments and the impact that the World Wide Web has had on radicalisation.

Finally we will look at radicalization from the eyes of those who have been subjected to it directly and how the process worked for them, what stages they went through and what the outcomes of that radicalization process were.

Firstly we should realize that not all radicalization ends in terrorism or violent extremism.  Some individuals and groups go through the radicalization stages without resorting to the attacks that we normally associate with radical terrorism.  As stated by Silber & Bhatt (2007, p. 9) “The full radicalization of a Western individual, or groups of individuals, does not always result in the committing of a terrorist act in the West”.

To try and understand why individuals become radicalised towards extreme terrorism can be difficult if simply ‘painting’ them with a broad brush.  Each individual case needs to be review to try and find the triggers that turn generally well educated, intelligent and economically comfortable people into terrorists. 

As we have previously seen with the definitions of terrorism, many have tried to define the processes of radicalization and from there to identify possible triggers to look for in a generalist way such as Silber & Bhatt (2007) and Precht (2007).

Buruma (2007, pp.187-213) researches an example of radicalization in his work on the murder in Amsterdam of a writer by Mohammed Bouyeri.  Bouyeri was by all accounts a troubled young man but had come from a comfortable family background with a reasonable intellectual level.

According to Buruma, Bouyeri’s descent into radicalization was quite quick with evidence being given at his trial by a Professor Ruud Peters who gave expert evidence that Bouyeri took around 12 months to “covert to Jihadism”.

However this is simplifying the process somewhat.  By Buruma’s account, and in citing testimony of others who knew Bouyeri socially, Bouyeri was a disturbed young man for some time with what appears to be some psychological issues that were not address early.

Bouyeri, Buruma states (2007, pp. 199-200) was originally described a cheerful boy who then ‘suffered’ a series of setbacks such as his local “youth club being demolished” and his hatred of any type of authority figures such as police.

Further ‘set-backs’ included being rejected by women who he then “considered easy” , his sister having a ‘boyfriend’ before she was married (even though he at the time had a girlfriend), the death of his mother and ultimately his desire to “the quest for Truth” (Buruma, 2007, p. 207).

It appears that as each setback occurred Bouyeri’s ability to deal with it was tested and ultimately he lacked the social or cognitive skills to deal with them.  He resorted to violence (Buruma, 2007, p. 201) and withdrew from familiar friends and family.

By 2002–2003 Bouyeri’s descent into jihadism was nearly completed.  It was during this period that he met Abou Khaled, a “radical Muslim preacher” whose message “was an extreme form of Islamic purism known as Takfir” (Buruma, 2007, p. 210).

According to like-minded friends at the time, Bouyeri idealized Khaled and referred to him as “The Sheik”.  Bouyeri began to become more radical and extremist in his views and posting those views on various websites.  Ultimately his hatred grew to “hating infidels” and aligning himself more with the views of Khaled.

At his trial for murder, Bouyeri had obviously completed his full transition into extreme radicalization within Islamic views.  He gave testimony that he would kill again and again if he was released into society and that the killing he was on trial for was “an act of faith” in that he killed for Allah (his victim had insulted Allah according to Bouyeri).

Bouyeri’s case is a good example of the slide into extreme radicalization.  To better understand it however and to test the assumptions of authors such as Silber & Bhatt (2007) and Precht (2007) we need to break down the ‘indicators’ that Bouyeri may have displayed to understand whether his behavior may have been predictable and if so, at what stage in the radicalization would it have been apparent.

Using Silber & Bhatt (2007) as an example, they developed a series of steps that radicalization takes from the beginning to the ultimate ending of full radicalization towards extreme violence. 

As discussed previously, Silber & Bhatt (2007, pp. 6-7) identified four major steps to radicalization which they defined as being: 1) Pre-Radicalisation, 2) Self-Identification, 3) Indoctrination and finally 4) Jihadisation.  The authors state however “each of these phases is unique and has specific signatures”.

In the case of Bouyeri however, we can see a progression or path that he made through these phases identified by Silber & Bhatt.  Bouyeri had moved into the first phase as being “unremarkable” and living an ordinary life.

Bouyeri reached the second phase of Silber & Bhatt’s (2007, pp. 6-7) indoctrination signatures by associating with “like-minded individuals and adopting this ideology as his own”.  He did this with Khaled and others he associated with that had similar beliefs. 

This stage strongly supports the assertion of Sageman (2008) where he (Sageman) suggests that the radicalization process generally requires the association with either family members of the same or similar beliefs or that the subject associate with people of like minded beliefs. 

Sageman (2008) further suggested that this need not occur early in the radicalization process as his four stage process “is not linear, nor a progression with easily definable boundaries”.

For the third phase of Silber and Bhatt’s signature behaviours, Bouyeri met this criteria through his intensified beliefs towards extremism and more so he had a ‘spiritual sanctioner’ as described by Silber & Bhatt (2007, p. 7) in Khaled.  To further establish this phase, Silber & Bhatt stated that “association with like-minded people is an important factor as the process deepens”(2007, p. 7).

Finally Bouyeri reached the final stage of Jihadisation which, according to Silber & Bhatt (2007, p. 7) requires the individual to “accept their duty to participate in Jihad and self-designate themselves as holy warriors”.  In classic style this is where Bouyeri found himself.

While specifically using Silber & Bhatt as the example here for the steps of radicalization, their description differs only slightly to that given by Pretch (2007) and also Buruma (2007).  Either of these examples would equally have applied when describing the stages and phases that Bouyeri travelled through towards radicalisation. 

What is interesting in this example and certainly other similar examples that Silber & Bhatt explored was that the idea of a four phased transition towards a Jihad radicalization is accurate and has merit in its description.  This discovery allows for further exploration into each of the phases in order to develop a counter-radicalisation program.

Sageman (2008) also identified four phases in the radicalization process with slight variations on those we have discussed so far.  He identified these stages as being: “1) moral outrage, 2) a perception of Islam under siege, 3) the resonance of moral outrage with personal experience” and finally “mobilization by networks”.

However in a review of Sageman’s (2008) work, the Middle East Policy Council (2012) identified a further important phase for Sageman’s theory as being “radical ideology”.  While the previous examples have been specific with this as part of the final two phases in the radicalization process, Sageman is less specific and only alludes to it in his work without the emphasis given to it by earlier models on radicalisation.

Esposito & Mogahed (2007, pp. 65-84) explored this area in their work on defining “what makes a radical”.  Their work revealed that the previous conventional opinions on the making of a terrorist included deficiencies in the individual (or group) in the areas of “psychological, sociological, economic, political and religious” aspects. (Esposito & Mogahed (2007, p. 67).

While this old mythology has been caste aside, there have been developments however in what may define a potential radicalization candidate.  For example, Silber & Bhatt (2007, p. 23) state that many of those radicalized to terrorism can be profiled as being “male Muslims (women generally assume a support role), under the age of 35, local residents, varied ethnic backgrounds, not economically destitute but from middle class backgrounds, well educated, perhaps recent converts to Islam and generally unremarkable in their lives with little criminal history”.

But while this profile was developed in 2007, work done in 1982 also provided a strikingly similar profile. In analysing the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981, Ibrahim (1982, pp. 5-6), along with others described the typical terrorist as being “young, of rural or small-town backgrounds, middle and lower middle class with high achievement records, upwardly mobile with science or engineering backgrounds and from a normally cohesive family”. 

This description fits well with the work of other researchers and shows a similar, near common thread in the majority of terrorists the subject of this research. 

However Sageman (2008) adds a further factor to the radicalization process that we briefly touched upon earlier.  Interestingly, the Middle East Policy Council in reviewing Sageman’s work suggest that Sageman implies that terror networks are built through “ties and kinship” and that these “connections often precede radicalization”.

If this is accurate that family ties play a significant factor, then this is a further important indicator to overlay the four identified by Silber &Bhatt (2007), Pretch (2007) and many others.  Sageman’s work (2008) also indicates a propensity for these radicalization processes to “run in families” indicating that family bonds strengthen and encourage the radicalization process within these groups.

Another assessment of potential radicalization triggers by Sageman (2008) needs to be included here. In his 2008 work which includes around 500 case studies that he analysed, Sageman identified a prevalence in terrorists study “engineering and medicine” along with other technical studies.  The reasons for this are unclear however the Middle East Policy Council (2012) identified this also and this particular aspect of ‘Education among Jihadists’ has been reviewed by Gambetta & Hertog (2007, p. 1-90). 

According to Gambetta & Hertog (2007, p. 6) “several scholars have mentioned in passing the link between radical Islam and science and engineering but no one has attempted to find a systematic confirmation of it, let alone a convincing explanation”.

In their research, Gambetta & Hertog (2007, p.58-59) make an interesting correlation between Sageman’s observations regarding the statistical inclination of terrorists being engineering or medically qualified.  They researched the work of Friedrich von Hayek (1952) who viewed engineering and the other social sciences as being “an education which does not train them to understand individuals and their world as the outcome of a social process in which spontaneous behaviours and interactions play a significant part. Rather, it fosters on them a script in which a strict ‘rational’ control of processes plays the key role”.

Sageman (2004, p. 116) has a much simpler, though similar, explanation however in that he “speculates that al-Qaeda members were individuals looking for easy truths, attracted by “unambiguous” fields like engineering or medicine, where there is little room for uncertainty”.

However the work of Gambetta & Hertog (2007, pp.77-80) came close to explaining the effects of radicalization on engineers as an example.  They concluded that it was a combination of two factors which presented themselves: the home geographical location of engineering students such as Singapore, Saudi Arabia and other similar countries where extremism is rife coupled with “relative deprivation and frustrated expectations”.

Secondly, they found that “mindset” was the other contributing factor.  Both factors, with the overlay of Islamism “as the only credible political opposition to authoritarian and corrupt establishments” provide the formula for easier radicalization in these groups studied by Gambetta & Hertog (2007, pp.78-79).

In relation to the generic description of potential radicalization subjects, it is also important to look towards the work of Esposito & Mogahed (2007, p. 70).  Where the generic description of potential extreme radicalization subjects are generally depicted as male, Esposito & Mogahed found that “while politically extreme radicals are more likely to be male (62%), 37% are female”. 

The work of Esposito & Mogahed (2007, pp. 65-84) is important to consider in the context of radical extremists.  Their research was primarily derived from polling within the “10 most populous majority Muslim countries, which make up 80% of the global Muslim population”.

Therefore it is research that cannot be easily ignored.  Statistically what Esposito & Mogahed (2007, pp. 69-70) found was that 7% of those Muslims polled were labeled in the research as ‘politically radicalised’ meaning their views were extreme while not guaranteeing they would actually commit acts of extreme violence or terrorism.

But within that 7% Esposito & Mogahed (2007, pp. 69-70) found that they had “the potential” to be a source for recruitment or for terrorist support networks.  Within this same group Esposito & Mogahed (2007, p. 70) found that they are more likely to support and commend civilian attacks as “justifiable”.    

However, not all young males (or females) who are well-educated and middle class drift towards extreme terrorist acts.  In fact not all young males in this category and who are subjected to radicalisation commit terrorist acts either.  At some point in the radicalization process there must be another convergence of either personality traits, circumstances or processes within the radicalization process where there is a ‘tipping point’ for some individuals or groups.

We have explored the generic profile for potential extreme radicalization subjects and identified some of the general traits that may be ‘indicators’ or ‘triggers’ towards the extreme end process of radicalization. 

However while we have skirted the religious issue in these profiles, which generally suggests that there is a convergence towards radical and extreme Islam in the radicalization process and thus religion is one of the main triggers for terrorist acts, Esposito & Mogahed (2007, pp. 72-79) found differently.

Statistically Muslims condemn the extreme terrorism acts and “cite the Quran” stating “Killing one life is as sinful as killing the whole world” (Quran: Verse 5:32).  Esposito & Mogahed (2007, pp. 73-74) found that of those Muslims who supported the extremist views and attacks of 9/11 for example, they cited not religion but politics as the authority for these acts.

Yet according to Silber & Bhatt (2007, p. 6), “Jihadist or jihadi-Salafi ideology is the driver that motivates young men and women, born or living in the West, to carry out “autonomous jihad” via acts of terrorism against their host countries. It guides movements, identifies the issues, drives recruitment and is the basis for action”.

It cannot be denied that generally acts of terrorism are associated with a religious movement by the general public, and more so than not that religious movement is believed to be Islam.

But is extreme and radical Islam and Jihad really that final ‘tipping point’ that produces an extremist reaction in individuals or groups at the end stages of radicalization?  Theoretically the answer is no according to the statistics of Esposito & Mogahed (2007, p. 75).

Perhaps Jihad and Islam should not be used in the descriptive behaviours of extreme terrorist acts.  Invoking a Jihad, according to Esposito & Mogahed (2007, p. 75) requires certain “conditions such as 1) it cannot be preemptive, 2) it must be declared by a state or religious body and 3) it must not target civilians”.  Quite clearly these requirements are rarely met when in the final stages towards extreme radicalization with violence being the end product.

Nevertheless it seems that religion, Islam and Jihad remain motivators in the minds of some or most extreme radicals.  What is also clear however in the material available is that the majority of these extremist radicals have views and understandings of their own religions that are not in keeping with the majority Islamic or Muslim views and understandings of, as an example, the Quran.

Perhaps the cause of extreme radicalization and the triggers that push individuals towards acts of terrorism lays in the mis-interpretation (including intentionally) of a particular religion or a lack of understanding either by accident, ignorance or through direct manipulation by themselves or others of the ‘true meaning and essence’ of their religious path.

As an example of this, Musallam (2005, pp. 150-165) provides a comprehensive review of the case of Sayyid Qutb, an Egyptian author who was imprisoned within Egypt from 1954 to 1964 and again in 1965 until his death in 1966 by hanging.

Qutb’s case is significant to the Islamic movement generally but also to the process of radicalization.  From the outset it should be noted however that Qutb was not a typical ‘victim’ of radicalization rather he was a writer who was to influence the Islamic Jihad significantly through his experiences within the Egyptian prison system.

While imprisoned, Qubt was a member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood who, according to Musallam (2005, p.151) most of which suffered extreme violence and were even murdered while in the prison system.

This impacted Qutb who, as a result of his writing passion and ability to develop significant works on issues such as the Qur’an, commenced his turn towards more extreme radicalism.

This was aided however by other events occurring at the time.  Another Pakistani Radical Islamic writer, al-Mawdudi, and taking his writings from Hindu and translating them into Arabic were influencing Qubt.  However, according to Musallam (2005, pp.151-152) Qutb was accused of placing a more extremist ideology into the Arabic translation than was intended by al-Mawdudi.

However Qubt’s writings continued to influence those searching for a more profound Islamic meaning.  In particular, Qutb’s theories had an impact on the wider Islamic community after his death with his works being published in many countries particularly with Arabic and Muslim influences.

Qutb’s case is significant in many ways.  He commenced being subjected to torture within a confined environment (prison) with others of a like mind. He had the skills and tools of a charismatic writer who wrote persuasively and plainly.  He read the works of al-Mawdudi and published his version of al-Mawdudi’s theory with an alleged lean towards more extremist views.

At this point, Qutb was, according to the phases of radicalization identified by Silber and Bhatt (2007, pp. 6-7), the victim of a radicalization process.  But Qutb was more than that.  He willingly entered the more radicalized views, albeit through circumstances not of choosing, and enabled his ideology to become more extreme through his understanding of al-Mawdudi’s writings.

What is interesting in this case is that Qutb’s position changes from one being radicalized himself to one who has radicalized and influenced many Arabic and Muslim people long after his death with the assistance of his brother, Mohammad Qutb who later went onto teach his brothers theories as a Professor of Islamic Studies.

It was through Qutb’s brother, Mohammad that a young impressionable student named Ayman Zawahiri, came to follow the writings of Qutb, which had a significant impact on his life and subsequently his beliefs.  Zawahiri went on to become a leading figure in al-Qaeda with a student he mentored, Osama bin Laden (Wright, 2006, p. 36).

Husain (2007, pp. 48-66) also writes from the point of view of an ‘insider’ having studied the works of Qutb and Mawdudi.  Husain also supports the assertion that Qutb reworked the original writings of Mawdudi and espoused extreme violence or ‘Jihad’ against the West

Husain’s ‘radicalisation’ was similar to a strategic, comprehensive marking campaign.  In fact, Husain states that one of the strategies employed by his Islamic Student Group was similar to that used by an automobile manufacturer.  Clever marketing campaigns are not dissimilar to radicalization strategies – only the outcome is.

Husain’s story however remains insightful and fascinating as a window to the world of the Islamic extremist as viewed from the inside.  His Islamic extremist period was in his University days where he associated with likeminded people, isolated himself from his family (in particular his father who did not share his son’s radical views) and became hostile and aggressive.

At this stage it is interesting to note that Husain was, like other before and after him, following the four phases that we have mentioned of radicalization and displaying the traits that Silber & Bhatt (2007, pp. 6-7), Sageman (2004 & 2007), Buruma (2007, pp.187-213) and others identified.

From a sociology viewpoint, Silber & Bhatt (2007, p. 8) give another excellent reason for the rise of radicalization in Europe where “Europe’s failure to integrate the second and thirdgeneration of its immigrants into society, both economically and socially, has left many young Muslims torn between the secular West and their religious heritage. This inner conflict makes them especially vulnerable to extremism—the radical views, philosophy, and rhetoric that is highly advertised and becoming more and more fashionable among young Muslims in the West”.

The work of Gambetta & Hertog (2007, pp. 77-80) supports the assertion of Silber & Bhatt (2007) that young Muslims are in fact being isolated and divided between their geographic home and relatives and the convergence of the western values that Europe offers.  This, in effect, causes a ‘weakness’ that radicalization can effectively and efficiently take advantage of. 

Again using Silber & Bhatt (2007, p. 8) they identified that the United States is not immune, though better prepared, to withstand the radicalization of Muslims.  They state “This ideology is proliferating in Western democracies at a logarithmic rate. The Internet, certain Salafi-based NGO’s (non-governmental organizations), extremist sermons /study groups, Salafi literature, jihadi videotapes, extremist – sponsored trips to radical madrassas and militant training camps abroad have served as “extremist incubators” for young, susceptible Muslims — especially ones living in diaspora communities in the West”.

While this quotation is long, their reference to the Internet, amongst others issues, is nevertheless important at this point. 

The Institute for Strategic Dialogue (2012, pp. 6-12) commissioned a report into ‘Using Social Media to Tackle Intolerance’ which states that peoples lives have “become far more compartmentalized” as a result of the new media such as Internet, Chat Rooms, Facebook and other social media platforms.

Further this same report states (2012, pp. 6-7) that this new social media can provide support to individuals who feel they are a minority by providing access to like-minded people.  While this has significant social value for many types, it also equally applies to people in the process of radicalization seeking ‘like-minded people’ such as in the case of Bouyeri as studied by Buruma (2007, pp. 211-212).

Additionally the report discusses the use of social media for extreme terrorist or religious connections (p. 9).  As we observed in the case of Bouyeri who sought out the company of people that were ‘like-minded’ to his extremist views, so too the report by the Institute for Strategic Studies (2012, p. 9) observes that “Much of the research on networks has highlighted the emphasis that human beings place on the closest ties within their own networks”.

In summarizing this subject, we have been able to view and assess a number of research papers and models for what causes extreme radicalization.  We have reviewed some of the leading academics work in this field and have been able to excavate a number of triggers or indicators, which may reveal the causes, and effectiveness of radicalization.

We have seen that a number of leading authorities have identified four main phases of radicalization, albeit that each of them slightly differ in what those phases entail. 

Overall it is generally accepted that there are four phases in the radicalization process that leads to terrorist action by some individuals and groups.  Generically these are: 1) Pre-Radicalisation, 2) a conversion from one belief to another, more extreme belief or a form of ‘self-discovery’, 3) an indoctrination into the more extreme belief and finally the full conversion to extreme violence or Jihadism as some explained.

These four phases have been variously, but similarly described by Sageman (2008 and 2004), Pretch (2007), Silber & Bhatt (2007) and Buruma (2007) to name a few.

But we have also discussed some other indicators that may be persuasive such as the profile of potential radicalization converts: a) young males are predominant (though not exclusive), b) well educated with a propensity to be engineers, medical doctors or similar professions, c) sound family backgrounds and d) mostly non-criminal pasts.

We have further layers of possible profiles through more intensive work done by researchers we have discussed such as: i) possibly some suffered prior trauma or witnessed the same committed by authority (see Bouyeri’s case and Qubt’s incarceration), ii) family ties to some form of extreme Islam, iii) close affiliation with like-minded people or groups and iv) a change in demeanour towards violence or outspoken opinions indicating violent propensities.

We have discussed the extended research by Gambetta & Hertog (2007) who have attempted to isolate even further the possible reasons for radicalization within technical areas such as engineering and medicine given us addition layers of reasons for radicalization such as relative deprivation, frustrated expectations and the ‘mindset’ of the individual.

Ultimately however, two people may meet all of these identified criteria and yet take two different paths – one towards extreme terrorism and the other non-violence.  It is the individual traits that will decide the path.

Given the research data available and through collating and analyzing current theories, there are now additional and more detailed indicators and markers that can be considered when dealing with suspected radicalized individuals or groups.  These can be refined to include;

•       Male (women tend to take up supporting roles)

•       Muslim

•       Under the age of 35 years

•       Local residents (frequently rural or small-town backgrounds)

•       Varied ethnic backgrounds

•       Well educated (medical science or engineering backgrounds are very common)

•       Middle class backgrounds (not economically destitute)

•       Family is a ‘normally cohesive unit’

•       Usually strong ‘ties and kinship’ connections with family

•       Tend to be ‘High Achievers’ – ‘Upwardly mobile’ descriptions are common

•       Perhaps recent converts to Islam

•       Generally unremarkable lives

•       Little if any criminal history

•       Usually some family relative has  connections  to other radicalised people

The indicators or triggers we have identified will show us only who may choose to take that extremist path.   

And after the Radicalisation, What Next?  (Part Two)

Recently, as a result of the current conflict in Afghanistan, a number of Australian soldiers have sadly been killed.  In a tribute to one of them, the Australian Prime Minister Julie Gillard stated (2011) “Our nation today is mourning the loss of a brave man, another brave man lost in the fight in Afghanistan.”

On the same day, July 5, 2011, an article by Bill Roggio appeared on a website titled ‘The Long War Journal’.  The article stated in part, and in reference to a bombing, “One policeman said the car bomb was detonated by a suicide bomber; other reports indicate it was detonated remotely. As Iraqis moved in to recover the dead and wounded, a suicide bomber detonated his vest among the crowd. Thirty-five Iraqis were killed and 28 more were wounded in the attack.”

So on the same day, July 5, 2011, one was deemed a hero – the other labelled a suicide terrorist.  Yet both gave their lives, in different parts of the world and on the same day, in what we call ‘armed conflict’.

At this junction it is worth noting that Pape (2005, pp. 218-219) gives the following description of a suicide attacker.  He states “The individuals who carry out suicide bombings are typically mentally normal, with good prospects for employment or other advancement in their society, and they enjoy good standing in their communities.  They are, in other words, much like ordinary soldiers with a strong sense of duty and a willingness to sacrifice all for the common good of their community”.

In this paper we will look at what the difference between these people, labelled suicide terrorists, is perceived to be and discuss whether that perception is correct or not. We will look at what a suicide attack is and what a suicide attacker uses as motivation to take his or her own life, either wilfully or by threats from others.   

To better understand what a suicide attack actually is we will also look at some definitions that have been developed by subject matter experts as well as some examples of suicide attacks.

While there are a couple of definitions of suicide attackers available, Schwitzer and Ferber’s definition (2005, p. 10), as stated by O’Brien (2010) states that “A politically motivated violent attack perpetrated by a self-aware individual who actively and purposely causes his/her own death when attacking the chosen target.  The death of the terrorist is a pre-condition for the success of the mission”.  Schwitzer, in partnership with Sari Ferber, studied Al Qaeda and its use of suicide terrorists.

Before looking at the more detailed aspects of suicide attackers and their motivations, let’s look at the term motivation.  According to the Encarta English Dictionary (2010) the term motivation itself means “the act of giving someone a reason or incentive to do something” (No. 1).  Further the definition continues to enthusiasm (No. 2) where “a feeling of enthusiasm, interest, or commitment that makes somebody want to do something, or something that causes such a feeling”. No. 3 is defined as “reason where a reason for doing something or behaving in a particular way” is the motivational driver.

The Encarta dictionary goes further still where it also describes, under the definition of motivation, the “forces determining behaviour” where “psychology, the biological, emotional, cognitive or social forces that activate and direct behaviour” (No. 4).  It is this last definition in particular that we shall observe emerging during the course of discussion in this paper.

While we will look at some motivators for suicide attacks in some detail, generally suicide attackers will have either one or more of the following motivators driving their actions.  These are, according to O’Brien (2010) “social status improvement, economic improvement, perceived forgiveness of sins, patriotism, eternal life in paradise, 72 young virgins at their disposal, the privilege to promise life in heaven to 70 relatives and hatred and revenge”.

Supporting this position, Victor (2003, pp. 111-112) goes further into the benefits expected when one martyrs themselves for Islamic purposes.  In her discussions with Sheikh Abu Shukheudem, he detailed for her the seven rewards that are given to the martyr “for his or her act of self-sacrifice”.

As he explains, “From the moment the first drop of blood is spilled, the martyr does not feel the pains of his injury, and is absolved of all his bad deeds; he sees his seat in Paradise; he is saved from the torture of the grave; he is saved from the fear of the Day of Judgement; he marries seventy two beautiful, black eyed women; he is an advocate for seventy of his relatives to reach Paradise; he earns the Crown of Glory, whose precious stone is better than all this world and everything in it”.

With this message being spread throughout the Muslim world, potential martyrs are obviously drawn to the attraction and promises that are on offer.  Of course, with no proof to the contrary, this message of hope really sells itself to those who are impressionable and who are looking for ‘something’, whatever that may be.   

Post (2007, p. 227) observes that “suicide terrorism is by no means a new technique” and goes further to the example of “Hezbollah’s truck bombing of the United States and the French embassies and of the United States Marine barracks in 1983” as examples of the modern era.

More importantly however, Post (2007, p. 227) goes further to say “And the tactic of suicide terrorism has been so refined and incorporated into terrorist strategy that today it has proven to be the most difficult tactic to counter”.

Pedahzur (2005, p.27) adds that the introduction of suicide attackers has been a strategic development by terrorist organisations brought about by the disproportionate balance of the terrorists and the ‘enemy’ they are fighting.  That meaning the terrorists are generally outnumbered and lack the total resources of their enemy and so resort to the tool of suicide terrorist to disable their enemy, a tactic which has been successful according to Pedahzur (2005, p.27).

As Post correctly observes, suicide attacks are becoming more common as a tool used by terrorist organisations to kill, maim and disrupt general populations no matter where they may be globally.  But in order to do this the terrorist organisations must have people who are willing to sacrifice themselves to achieve these goals.  These suicide attackers must have some compelling motivation to do this.

An excellent example of suicide terrorist motivation is that of a female named Dhanu, “alias Anbu alias Kalaivani” which Pape (2005, pp. 226-230) discusses in some detail.  According to Pape, Dhanu was a female in her late 20’s, attractive, and a member of the Tamil Tigers elite suicide team. Pape states that “On May 21, 1991, she (Dhanu) hid a girdle of grenades beneath her gown, presented a garland to Rajiv Gandi, India’s top political figure, and exploded, instantly killing them both”.

Let’s look at what makes a beautiful young woman kill herself in this way.  Dhanu’s story goes further back to the late 1980’s where, according to Pape (2005, p. 226), she was gang-raped and her four brothers killed by Indian soldiers in her town of Jaffna in the Tamil region of Sri Lanka.  As Pape observes, this treatment was probably the catalyst that drove her motivation which can be best described as that of revenge.

But this was not merely your average revenge killing.  According to Pape (2005, pp. 227-228) Dhanu “belonged to the female suicide bomber unit of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam that goes by the name of Black Tigresses”.    

It also seems obvious that the motivation of revenge cannot be under-estimated.  Pape (2005, pp. 227-230) describes the training and preparation that Dhanu went through to fulfil her mission as a suicide attacker including a number of ‘selection criteria’ that must be met.  For example, Pape discusses how Dhanu would have had to go through particular steps before her ‘selection’ for the role as a suicide attacker.

As Pape states (2005, p. 229) those steps include displaying and convincing the LTTE that the suicide attacker has a “high level of motivation to complete the mission”, secondly that “the suicide attackers are trained in special camps” and thirdly “the LTTE suicide attackers routinely conduct dress rehearsals near the intended location of an attack”.  Each of these criteria has to be satisfied by the motivated suicide attacker.

When we refer back to the definition of motivation from the Encarta dictionary, we can see that Dhanu would certainly fit into the category of No. 4 where the example definition of “forces determining behaviour” fits her circumstances as well as No. 1, the giving of reason to act (as a result of the rape and killing of her brothers).

While Dhanu’s suicide attack fits well into her personal motivation for revenge, there are other suicide attackers whose motivation fits more comfortably into all four of the motivational categories as described by the definition in Encarta (2010).

Richardson (2006, pp.155-156) observes an interesting perspective on what possibly adds to the motivational factors for female suicide attackers.  He identified, through interviews with friends and family of female suicide attackers, that the motivators between female attackers and “their male counterparts might be somewhat different”. 

Richardson also states (2005, p.155) that the females in the study have generally suffered more at the hands of their perceived oppressors.  Issues such as rape, embarrassment to the family values, divorce and other such things tend to place the female in a more weakened, psychological state.  That, coupled with the other motivators such as religion (to a lesser degree than men it seems), revenge and the terrorist organisations strategic struggle doctrines may further ‘move’ the female towards potential suicide activities.  

In the case of Palestinian suicide attackers, Richardson (2005, p. 156) states that the ‘movements insistence on taking only psychologically sound volunteers does not extend to women”.

As an example of this, Post (2007, pp. 227-237) discusses the situation of suicide terrorists from a Palestinian perspective.  Post discusses the early indoctrination of Palestinian children, from kindergarten age onwards, towards the hatred of Israel and its people.

In a discussion Post (2005, pp. 228-229) had with a noted Israeli terrorism expert in 2004, Post reflects on the substance of the talk.  He states “The Israeli terrorism expert, Ariel Merari, who teaches at Harvard Law School, made a revealing comment to me in the fall of 2004.  “As I walk around Harvard Square”, he said, “I am struck by the fact that teenagers are teenagers the world around”.  He (Merari) went onto explain that when he entered a pizza parlour off the square, he would find the teenagers talking excitedly about their favourite team, the New England Patriots”. 

Post continues “They were talking admiringly about their heroes on the team, such as the quarterback.  And when they grew up, they wanted to be professional football players like their heroes. “Same thing,” he (Merari) said, “in the Palestinian refugee camps.  Only their favourite team is Hamas.  Their heroes are the shahids (the martyrs) and when they grow up, which they won’t, they want to be a shahid like their heroes”.  Post describes the conversation as “It was a chillingly normal remark”.

Schweitzer and Ferber (2005, p. 26) supports this in part through his studies of the Al-Qaeda organisation where he states “The principal aim of a jihad warrior, sacrifice in the name of Allah, is presented in terms of enjoyment”.

According to Post (2007, p. 229) however, this “assembly line” process has changed.   Post gives a summary of the Palestinian suicide bomber development through the early to mid 1990’s where Hamas suicide bombers were attempting to undermine the Oslo negotiations at the time.  Post states (2005, p. 229) that these suicide bombers were mainly young men, they were not ‘brainwashed’, 17 to 22 years of age, uneducated, unemployed and unmarried.  Post further explains that “these new terrorists shatter the profile of the Palestinian suicide terrorists developed by the Israeli terrorism experts” (p. 229).

Post (2007, p. 229) says that “the statistics have now changed.  The age range is 13 to 55, with women as well as men volunteering, and some are older adults with families. Moreover, they volunteer sometimes only hours before the bombing”.  Interestingly Post explains (2005, p. 229) that the new recruits “grew up in a culture of martyrdom and were eager for the task ahead”.

Sageman (2004, pp. 61-98) also discusses the issue of profiling suicide terrorists in his work looking in particular at the Mujahedin.  Sageman (2004, p. 96) agrees that the general findings do reject the “conventional wisdom about terrorists” and he found that these people were “generally middle class, educated young men from caring and religious families, who grew up with strong positive values of religion, spirituality, and concern for their communities”. 

Sageman continues (2004, pp. 82-83) that in relation to suicide terrorism the issue of mental or psychological impairment may be a possibility.  Bearing in mind that Sageman’s principal work was on the Mujahedin, he finds that they also reject suicide but the Mujahedin “legitimizes and encourages the nobility of martyrdom”.  Sageman’s findings and research of the Mujahedin are nearly identical to the work done by Post and others in their findings of the terrorist organisations views on suicide attacks.

However it is interesting that while the Koran, in particular the matters relating to suicide, is being interpreted in a particular way by some terrorist organisations, we need look no further than the King James Bible in western cultures for a similar view.  While the bible is full of passages of sacrifice, the verse of John (16:13) states “greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends”.  

As we can see, this passage may easily be interpreted to also support a legitimate case for suicide attacks and while a number of people remain critical of the Qur’an interpretations, western societies need to reconcile the fact that we too have some considerations to make in relation to our understanding and interpretation of our own religious writings.  That said it is a long bow that is drawn if we read into the King James Bible that suicide attacks, resulting in the death and destruction of innocent people, is condoned.  

The view by Post (2007, p. 229) is interesting in that it basically supports the assertion that the ‘heavy lifting’ as it were was done by the Palestinian youth of the early 1990’s and that the need for further indoctrination by Hamas isn’t necessary – today’s potential suicide attackers have grown up with the necessary beliefs.  Indeed the “signs on the walls of Hamas run kindergartens read: ‘The children of the kindergarten are the shahids of tomorrow” according to Post (2007, p. 228).  The desire for shahid seems to be a way of life for the youth of Palestine.

This genealogical motivation however may, for the most part, not be persuasive enough for many.  However looking deeper into the psychological aspects of motivation for the Palestinians we can see much more – a deep seated hatred of Israel.

For example, in an article by Sarraj (2005, pp. 36-40) from an excerpt quoted from the Palestine-Israel Journal 10,  No. 1, he explains the following, “The Palestinians have been driven to a state of hopelessness and despair, the kind of despair that comes from a situation that keeps getting worse, a despair where living becomes no different from dying.  Desperation is a very powerful force – it is not only negative, but it can propel people to actions or solutions that would have previously been unthinkable”.

Further Sarraj states “Suicide bombing is an act of ultimate despair, a horrific reaction to extremely inhuman conditions in a seriously damaged environment of hopelessness.  Suicide bombing is the ultimate cry for help”.

From the perspective of a western civilisation, this apparent desperation can be hard to imagine. After all, what can be as bad as to drive someone to not only kill innocent women and children, but also to kill themselves in the process?

To help us understand a little better, the following statement from a female suicide attacker in her preparations for carrying out the attack details her reasons for doing so.  Bloom (2005, p. 90) gives the following account as “An art history student explained why she was preparing for a suicide mission (bombing), “At the moment of executing my mission, it will not be purely to kill Israelis, the killing is not my ultimate goal.  My act will carry a message beyond to those responsible and the world at large that the ugliest thing for a human being is to be forced to live without freedom”.

It can be difficult to balance the motivational issues surrounding the suicide attacker when considering the prescribed teachings from which they draw their authority, in part at least.  In readings from the Qur’an for example, taken from Dawood (2003, p. 64) it is clear that suicide is against the religious teachings. In a direct excerpt from Dawood it states “Do not kill yourselves”.

While this statement appears quite clear and easily understood, it seems to be a matter of how it is ultimately interpreted as to what it really is supposed to mean.  So what is it that motivates a person to move against their religious teachings and take their own life in the process of taking the lives of innocent people?

To answer that in part, Kramer (1990) cites “Ayatollah Fadlallah, a spiritual mentor of Hezbollah, who ingeniously reinterpreted Koranic verses that proscribe suicide in order to justify it and other prohibited acts, such as kidnapping and hostage taking by observing that extreme circumstances permit, indeed require, taking extreme acts”. 

Supporting this view of reinterpretation of the Koran is Post (2007, p. 232) in interviews he conducted with incarcerated leaders of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah and Al-Aqsa Martyr Brigades. When asked “why they carried out these terrorist acts in the name of Allah and how suicide terrorism can be justified, one Hamas respondent became quite angry and said “This is not suicide. Suicide is weak, it is selfish, it is mentally disturbed.  This is Istishhad. (Martyrdom in the name of Allah)”. 

This particular statement is interesting because it reinterprets the meaning of the Qur’an as most people understand it.  It is a clear statement that suicide by attack is not only condoned by the Hamas and possibly other similar organisations, but is expected.  As a result, martyrdom will follow for the suicide terrorist.

Our earlier discussions on the King James Bible passage (John, 16:13) are worth remembering at this point.  It seems that the ‘interpretation’ of both the Koran and the King James Bible hold the key into either condoning or expelling any suicide or suicide attack activity.

In his work on suicide terrorists, Hoffman (2006, p. 131) states that “religion has a greater impact in propelling the vast increase in suicide attacks since 2001 (9/11)”.   Further Hoffman (2006, p. 131) states that “of the thirty five terrorist organisations employing suicide tactics in 2005, 86 percent were Islamic”.  As a motivator, it seems that religion reigns supreme.

This is also supported by Ruqaiyah (1997, p. 6) where within the conclusions of his paper entitled ‘The Islamic Legitimacy of the Martyrdom Operations, “Through the above evidences from the Qur’an and the Sunnah, it is clearly demonstrated that the ‘Islamic Bombing Assault’ or the ‘Martyrdom Attack’ is Islamically legitimate as far as it is within the framework of Islam”.

This paper by Ruqaiyah is significant in that it provides an academic inquiry of the issue and the subsequent conclusion is that the suicide attacks are permitted by religion, provided they are not suicide for reasons of “impatience, desperation or any other bad and evil objects’.  In other words, do not commit suicide for suicide’s sake, however if it is for a greater cause, it is permitted.

Pedahzur (2005, pp. 30-31) gives an interesting example of this in discussing the events of the Japanese suicide bombings in the second world war.  Pedahzur observes that these suicide attacks were used later in the war when the Japanese were beginning to be outnumbered and out-manoeuvred by the Allied Forces.  This approach, according to Pedahzur, is that of altruistic suicide where the issue of culture becomes the motivational factor. In the case of the Japanese suicide attackers, there are many writing references to support the fact that they died for the pride of their country, their family and their leader. 

Ruqaiyah also goes further (1997, p. 5) to provide four “essential motivations that justify such attacks being seeking for martyrdom, hurting the enemy, encouraging Muslims and weakening the spirit of the enemy”.   

Another consideration for a motivation for suicide terrorists then, in considering the above comments from Ruqaiyah, is in fact the success of previous suicide terrorists.  That is, the number of successful missions conducted by a terrorist organisation’s suicide cells may be a motivational factor for other terrorists to do the same.

The benefits to a terrorist organisation of a successful suicide mission may vary slightly but are predominantly the same across all the terrorist organisations.  According to O’Brien (2010), these benefits include “many casualties, media coverage, precisely chosen time and place of attack, almost guaranteed success, and no need for a planned escape route, security of the mission, psychological and social damage and the possibility of conducting a secondary attack”.

In reading the above motivations from O’Brien (2010) as well in conjunction with the others discussed from Ruqaiyah and others, we can see a clearer picture of what motivates a suicide terrorist.  It may be one, or a combination of some, or all of the above factors which will decide the ultimate course of a suicide terrorist.

References – Part One

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